The Literal-Metaphorical-Anomalous Distinction credited with the ability to categorize.
It follows from this that the production and comprehension of metaphors as figurative devices must await the later stages of concrete operations (see, for example, Cometa & Eson, 1978) .
In our opinion both of these positions are too extreme. For example, it is by no means clear that renaming is necessarily metaphorical in nature.
If, in calling a green carpet "grass" the child is merely noticing an (interesting) similarity of color and texture, this hardly seems sufficient to justify calling the production metaphorical. Nor is it enough to know that the child knows the word for carpet. Rather, what seems to be needed is that the child also knows that carpets and grass belong to different conventional categories.
The issue, of course, all hinges on what one means by calling a production a metaphor. Our view is that there are several criteria, each adding to the quality and depth of a metaphor. A necessary condition for a statement to be considered metaphorical is that it is based on a meaningful comparison between terms drawn from different conventional categories, although, as Sternbergandhis collaborators (e.g., Sternberg, Tourangeau & Nigro, 1979; in press) have noted, the less remote these categories are, the less metaphorical is the comparison. Another criterion--one that usually characterizes adult metaphors but, as we will later argue, is rarely present in child metaphors--is that the respects in which the two things are alike are differentially important or central to the two terms. Ortony (1979) refers to these two sources of metaphoricity as domain incongruence and salience imbalance respectively. The claim is that if two terms come from different domains they cannot be literally similar because they are different kinds of things. However, comparisons between such terms are not necessarily meaningless. Thus, there seem to be three kinds of similarity statements: (a) There are literal similarity statements such as A river is like a lake. These are cases in which there are discernible nontrivial similarities between objects belonging to the same category.
(b) There are nonliteral similarity statements such as A river is like a snake. These are cases in which there are discernible nontrivial similarities between objects belonging to different conventional categories. We shall sometimes refer to such statements as metaphorical comparisons. Finally, (c) there are anomalous similarity statements such as A river is like a cat, in which the compared terms come from different categories but where there are no discernible nontrivial similarities.
If metaphors are defined in terms of nonliteral similarity, then we need to know whether the child who is credited with the ability to produce and comprehend metaphors can distinguish literal from nonliteral similarity, rather than whether he or she can merely distinguish meaningful comparisons from anomalous ones, or whether he or she has a complete understanding of hierarchical ordering and class inclusion relations.
The experiment we conducted was designed as a first step towards exploring children's distinctions between literal, metaphorical, and anomalous comparisons. It should be stressed that we were interested, in this part of the investigation, in examining children's conceptions of similarity as they relate to the understanding of verbal metaphor. Thus, the task we used was a verbal one that probed children's conceptions of similarity based on their representations of objects in memory.
The Literal-Metaphorical-Anomalous Distinction
In the experiment children and adults were asked to verbally complete statements of the form "A is like . . .," such as "A river is like a .. ."
choosing one of two words. This task will be referred to as the comparison task. Each A term (e.g., river) in these incomplete similarity statements appeared in combination with three word pairs each of which resulted in Most of the metaphorical alternatives were selected from records of children's spontaneous metaphor (e.g., Chukovsky, 1968; Koch, 1970) , and focussed on perceptual similarity between the two terms. The literal alternatives involved objects from the same category as the A term. In the anomalous alternatives the terms were chosen so as to minimize any obvious shared attributes.
To confirm our intuitions about the relative degree of similarity between the different comparison types all the similarity statements were rated by 15 adult judges on a scale from 1 to 6. For each item the mean similarity rating for the two terms was always higher for the literal comparison that for the corresponding metaphorical comparison, which in turn was always higher than for the corresponding anomalous comparison.
Overall, the mean judged similarity was 4.6 for the literal comparisons, 3.3 for the metaphorical comparisons, and 1.1 for the anomalies. These
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being collected in our lab.
Procedure
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the two tasks, and tested individually.
In the comparison task they were asked to say whether "A is like B or C," while in the categorization task were asked to say whether "A is the same kind of thing as B or C." Before indicating their selection subjects were asked to repeat B and C to make sure that they remembered and took into consideration both items. At the end of the experimental session the subjects were asked to justify their last five choices.
Prior to participating in the experiment all the children were given a pretest of their comprehension of the relations "like" and "same kind of thing." They were shown three toys--a red truck, a yellow van, and a white kitchen stove. Children in the comparison task were asked to indicate both which items were "like" each other and which was "different" from the others.
Since the purpose of the study was to determine whether young children could distinguish literal from metaphorical similarity, the pretest only attempted to check that children understood "like" in the context of literal similarity. Children in the categorization task were asked to indicate which items were "the same kind of thing" and which was "a different kind of thing." Two 3 year olds failed to pass this pretest and were excluded from the experiment. The whole experimental session lasted approximately 30 minutes, and was tape-recorded.
Results
First each subject was given a score based on the number of his or her literal responses in the M/L and L/A pair types in the comparison and categorization tasks. The mean number of these literal responses in the two tasks for each age group appears in Table 2 . 
----------------------
Insert Table 2 about here. these metaphorical responses appears also in Table 2 . There, of course, Using a t test for single means, each mean for all pair types in both tasks was compared against the probability that it occurred by chance (.50).
As can be seen in Table 2 , children of 4 years and older chose the literal and metaphorical alternatives over the anomalous ones in the L/A and M/A pairs in both tasks, and they chose the literal over the metaphorical alternatives in the M/L pairs in the categorization task.
The 3 year olds also rejected the anomalies in the comparison task, but failed to choose the literal over the metaphorical alternatives in the categorization task.
Discussion
The first important finding was that in both tasks the children, In fact, the data shows nopreference responses at all ages. None of the groups selected literal or metaphorical completions significantly more often than chance. In other words, the 3 year olds, like adults, treat metaphorical similarity statements as bona fide similarity statements. Thus the crucial result in the comparison task is the universal rejection of anomalies.
It might still be argued that at least the adult subjects should have preferred the literal over the metaphorical pairs, especially since the adult ratings for the corresponding comparisons indicated that their perceived similarity was greater. This lack of preference can be explained if it is assumed that subjects, realizing that both alternatives were "correct," employed one of several alternative strategies to resolve their dilemma. Inspection of the protocols showed that most adults and older children were quite systematic, some choosing predominately metaphorical comparisons, others making primarily literal selections instead.
An increase with age in the number of literal responses in the M/L pair types did occur in the categorization task, where, in contrast to the comparison task, the literal alternative was clearly the correct choice.
This difference between the two tasks accounts for the interactions between age and task, age and pair type, and age, task and pair type obtained in the analysis of variance on the literal responses. The fact that in the categorization task all children except the 3 year olds selected the literal over the metaphorical alternatives significantly more than chance would predict is important.
It suggests that these
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It could be objected that the children who selected the literal alternatives in the categorization task were doing so because they selected high associates and not because they knew that the two terms belonged to the same category. While it is true that terms from the same category are likely to be highly associated, the fact that children of the same age did not choose the high associate in the comparison task argues against using association to account for their responses in (only) the categorization task. It is more parsimonious to assume that the children who were 4 years and older chose words that belonged to the same category. have noticed (Bowerman, 1978; Nelson, 1978) , they did not seem to have this information well organized in terms of the relative importance of the different attributes. Evidence for this was provided in the explanations of their choices in both tasks. For example, perceptual similarity, especially similarity in shape, was often the critical dimension on which both categorization and similarity judgements were based. This dimension has often been cited as a potent determinant of children's similarity judgements (Gardner, Winner, Bechhofer & Wolf, 1978; Winner, et al., 1980) .
At other times choices appeared to be based on attributes that, from an adult perspective, seemed to be relatively unimportant (e.g., eyes are like a bicycle because they are both blue). Sometimes a judgement was based on an important attribute of the first object but a relatively unimportant attribute of the second object (e.g., the moon is the same kind of thing as a shoe because the moon is round and a shoe's heel is round).
Sometimes an important attribute cited for the first object seemed not to be an attribute of the second object at all (e.g., a river is the same kind of thing as a cat because a river has water, the sun is like a chair because the sun is round), and finally sometimes the child provided no substantive justification whatever (e.g., clouds are like ice cream because I like ice cream).
Although traces of these types of reasoning were also found in the 4 year old group, children of that age showed that they could reason about their choices in ways much more similar to those of adults. They could easily focus on the important attributes that the two objects shared and as a result produced many more literal responses, especially in the categorization task (e.g., a river is the same kind of thing as a lake because there is water in both of them, a leg is the same kind of thing as an arm because they are parts of the body, etc.).
Although neither task alone has anything to say about the emergence of the literal/metaphorical distinction, taken together, they provide a basis for attributing some metaphoric competence to the 4 year old child.
First, the results of the comparison task showed that all children, even the 3 year olds, distinguish between two kinds of similarity statements, those that make sense (i.e., literal and metaphorical) and those that do not (i.e., anomalous). Further, the results of the categorization task showed that after about 4 years of age, children are aware that the terms in such statements belong to different conventional categories. Since the subjects for both tasks were drawn from the same population and were tested with the same materials it is reasonable to assume that 4 year olds both prefer metaphorical to anomalous comparisons and are aware that the terms involved in metaphorical comparisons do not belong to the same conventional category, while those in literal comparisons do. It is on this basis that we are willing to attribute some metaphorical competence to them. In other words, it appears that by 3 years of age children see only undifferentiated similarity, distinguishing that from anomaly, while by 4 they also know that some meaningful similarity statements compare terms from the same conventional category, while other meaningful comparisons involve terms from different categories. While the present results suggest that one should be cautious about attributing metaphorical competence to very young children (sometimes even younger than 2 years old) who engage in renaming, they also argue against the other extreme, whereby such competence is denied to children prior to the stage of concrete operations. The finding that by 4 years of age children appear to be able to distinguish meaningful comparisons that are literal from those that are metaphorical suggests that they have their knowledge adequately organized to understand when the terms in a meaningful comparison belong to different conventional categories, and that, therefore, they have at least one important prerequisite for metaphor production and comprehension. However, we say "one important prerequisite"
advisedly. The metaphorical comparisons used in this study, as well as the "so-called" child metaphors usually encountered in the literature, differ from adult metaphors in certain important respects. First, they rely almost exclusively on perceptual similarity (and, occassionally, on similarity between the actions associated with the compared objects).
This is not an accidental phenomenon. The perceptual properties of objects are very salient for children--in many cases they almost exhaust their knowledge of objects. For adults, however, perceptual predicates, while not representing trivial properties of objects, are less central than other kinds of predicates such as those having to do with causal and structural relations, functional attributes, etc. (see Carbonell, 1981 for an interesting discussion of the relative importance of different kinds of conceptual relations). For example, knowledge of the sort that the sun is an astronomical object, the center of the solar system, a source of heat, light and energy, is much more central to the concept of "sun" for an adult than the perceptual information that it appears to the eye as a disc and that it has an orange color. is to be sufficient differentiation of salience levels there needs to be a rather rich knowledge representation, which the young child might well lack. Children know relatively little about objects in general, so what they do know tends to be highly salient. There is, as it were, insufficient room in the schemas of a young child to permit any significant degree of salience imbalance. In this sense, the young child's appreciation of metaphors (both in production and in comprehension) is likely to be rather limited. Second, for the adult, perceptual properties tend to be subordinate to more abstract properties, regardless of the object. Thus, when two objects are metaphorically similar, salience imbalance for perceptual attributes is unlikely.
To the extent that they lack much salience imbalance, metaphorical comparisons will not exhibit the asymmetries ordinarily characteristic of them (Ortony, 1979) . Thus, while Sleeping pills are like lectures is very odd in comparison to Lectures are like sleeping pills, Pancakes are like ears is not much worse that Ears are like pancakes! It does seem to be the case that the kinds of metaphors children produce and understand tend not to undergo significant meaning changes when reversed, although syntactic constraints make some of them sound awkward when reversed.
In conclusion, we speculate that children start with an undifferentiated notion of similarity which at about the age of 4 becomes differentiated into literal and nonliteral similarity. Then, as children gain more experience of the world the richness of their knowledge begins to permit the production and comprehension of nonliteral comparisons which do not rely solely on descriptive properties of objects but on properties of a more abstract and relational nature. This knowledge in turn allows for comparisons between objects whose schemata permit more differentiated salience levels of their constituents and thus, a more sophisticated appreciation of metaphor.
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